More on short selling and risk

In the comment thread below John Chow's follow up post on Short Screen, a commenter wrote,

If you go long the maximum you can lose is 100% of what you invested. (As I did with my smart investment in Enron!)

If you go short, but the shares rise in value, you then have to purchase them at this higher amount. How much is that higher amount? It is limitless. Thus you are exposed to a massive risk that is unknown at purchase.

Imagine you had decided to short Volkswagen before the massive swing in its share price saw its market capitalization hit $364 billion, making it the most expensive company in the world. Many experienced hedge fund managers were on the wrong side of this trade.

Shares prices do move sharply, particularly those thinly traded and small caps. If you are going short, then you could well be in for a nasty shock.

I recommend The Intelligent Investor by Benjamin Graham (first published in 1949).

In response, I wrote,

Questions about short selling and risk came up in the comment thread following Michael Kwan’s original review of Short Screen. I summarized those questions and addressed them on my blog, if you would like to take a look, “Short selling and risk”.

The Intelligent Investor by Benjamin Graham is an excellent book. I have read it and would recommend it as well. Regarding Graham, you may be interested to know that one his first teaching assistants and proteges, Irving Kahn, is, I believe¹, still an active investor at over 100 years of age. Kahn is no stranger to short selling. In fact, an article in Smart Money several years ago noted that one of Kahn’s first big investing successes was with a short:

Along the way, Kahn got to know many of Graham’s famous disciples, including Warren Buffett. A gutsy Kahn wasn’t swept up in what he calls the “crazy market” of the late 1920s. In fact, his first trade in the summer of 1929 actually was a short sale of Magma Copper that turned out to be a winner in a few months.

¹Kahn is still listed under the investment personnel section on the Kahn Brothers website, so I assume he is still alive and investing.

Edelheit Agonistes

From the comment thread last month on his pick Hemisphere GPS (TSX: HEM.TO) on the Value Investors Club:

issambres839 (Aaron Edelheit):

How does a company that has no debt go from having a $250 million market cap to a $15 million market cap excluding net working capital?

While clearly $5 per share last May was too high in hindsight, is US$0.75 a little ridiculous?

Judging from the price action since then, apparently $0.75 was a "little ridiculous", but this one of the responses Edelheit got last month to his question:

oogum858:

Hi Issambres. . .I don't know anything about this company, but to your question of:

"How does a company that has no debt go from having a $250 million market cap to a $15 million market cap excluding net working capital?"

Obviously one potential answer is "Because the company is worth $15mm"

Given the desperate nature of your question I wanted to at least write down the most obvious response. I do this not to be a jerk, but because you seem to be insanely frustrated and at the very least it's good to try to think clearly about such things. Mr. Market revalues companies all the time and it can be really exasperating when you think he/it/whatever is totally wrong. But you have to make allowances for the divergent opinion. I'm sure you're thinking about this question all the time, so sorry if this seems condescending. . but i dunno... how else could an uninformed VIC member answer your question?

Some other interesting comments there, and some thoughtful responses from Edelheit. Worth reading.

Stocks for the (Very) Long Run

From John Authers's column in today's Financial Times ("Long View: Why baby boomers will put their faith in bonds"):

US stocks have now underperformed Treasury bonds since 1969. Very few savers actively putting money away today started much before 1969. Most of them did so during a period when the cult of the equity held sway. For this whole generation, that belief in equities has proved badly misplaced. Various long-term surveys show that there have been very long periods of underperformance by equities in the past.

But we can say that the current sell-off is almost without precedent for its speed. [Research Affiliates' Rob] Arnott’s figures show that as Wall Street opened on Friday it was already dealing with the second biggest six-month decline in its history. The only bigger six-month drop was barely larger, at 51 per cent, at the end of the crash of 1932.

The good news is that 1932 marked the bottom of the great bear market of the 1930s, and that stocks rallied more than 100 per cent in a matter of weeks.

The bad news is that there were still 22 years to go before stocks regained their highs in nominal terms, and 26 years before they regained their highs in real terms, an event that did not happen until 1958.

[...]

All of this could shatter our confidence in stocks as the vehicle for the long run. While the evidence is still unequivocal that they do perform best over the very long term, the periods may be so long that they do not help some people during their lifetimes.

A couple of thoughts on this:

1) The shattering of confidence Authers mentions above, and the associated revulsion toward stocks, explains the multiple compression that Vitaliy Katsenelson wrote occurs during secular range-bound (or bear) markets (see his graphic above, or this post for elaboration on Katsenelson's thesis).

2) This column wouldn't have been a revelation to Benjamin Graham. Unlike the advocates of buy & hold indexing in recent years, Graham was well aware that stocks, broadly speaking, could under-perform for painfully long periods. Graham wrote this on p.12 of the third edition of his Security Analysis, which was published in 1951:

"Prior to 1929, one could say with some logic that the course of common stock prices appeared to be so determinedly upward that the intending holder of high-grade stocks for investment could afford to buy them at any time and to ignore their fluctuations. In the past 20 years there is no longer any clear-cut evidence of an underlying and persistent upward trend in common stocks taken as a whole."

Hence, Graham focused on investment strategies that didn't rely on a secular bull market lifting most stocks¹. Incidentally, he didn't know it when he wrote the quote above, but a new secular bull market had already begun when the third edition of Security Analysis was published -- one that would continue for about another 15 years.

The graphic above is from Katsenelson's website.

¹Worth remembering though that even Graham took a beating during the Great Crash: According to James Grant, in his introduction to the latest edition of Security Analysis, Graham lost 70% of his money (The Dow dropped 89.5% over the same 1929-1932 period).

"Too Many Bullish Arguments Suffer from a Lack of Imagination"

From Tony Jackson's column in yesterday's Financial Times, "Too many bullish arguments suffer from lack of imagination":

There seems to be growing support for the notion that equities have reached fair value. This raises two questions: how far it is true, and how far it is useful.

As to the latter, I described a month ago how the UK consultant Andrew Smithers, drawing on work by the US academic Robert Shiller, concluded the US market was fairly valued with the S & P 500 at 880 - roughly its level today. But as Mr Smithers also found, previous serious market collapses did not end until they were, on average, at only half fair value.

This is unsurprising. If markets never undershot, they would never overshoot either.

Later in his column, Jackson questions the conclusion of Morgan Stanley economist Joachim Fels's recent essay, "Neither Japan nor The Great Depression" (which was the subject of an eponymous post here last week):

Morgan Stanley has just produced a piece declaring that the present downturn is "neither the Great Depression or Japan". The argument boils down to saying that all previous policy mistakes have been avoided this time.

But that, of course, carries a hidden premise: that all possible mistakes were contained in those two episodes. That is, none of today's policy actions will turn out later to have been blunders.

Any takers on that one?

From Joel Greenblatt to Jim Rogers, Part I: The Magic Formula

The intent of this series of posts is to put my later posts about specific investment ideas in context, by describing the evolution of my thinking on investing over the last year and a half, as I've made mistakes and tried to learn from them. I'm going to break this up into a few posts, just to keep each post from being too long.

The Magic Formula

For those unfamiliar with the Magic Formula, it's Joel Greenblatt's Buffett- and Graham-inspired mechanical system of buying a basket of "good" and "cheap" stocks. From Graham, Greenblatt got the emphasis on buying a basket of cheap stocks. In the Magic Formula, Greenblatt uses earnings yield, defined as EBIT/Enterprise Value, to measure "cheapness". Greenblatt uses EBIT instead of earnings to account for differences in interest payments and taxes among different companies, and he uses enterprise value instead of price to account for different levels of net cash or net debt. From Buffett, Greenblatt got the emphasis on finding "good" companies, defined as companies with high returns on tangible capital. Greenblatt calls this return on invested capital (ROIC) and defines it as [EBIT/(Net working capital + Net fixed assets)]. Greenblatt set up a website, Magic Formula Investing.com, to make it easy for individual investors to follow this system. The site ranks its universe of thousands of (mostlyAmerican) stocks by earnings yield and by return on invested capital, and lists those stocks that have the best combined scores (i.e., not necessarily the "cheapest" or the "best", but the stocks that represent the best combination of "cheap" and "good" according to the system).

After reading Joel Greenblatt's The Little Book that Beats the Market in late 2006, I began investing the better part of my money according to the methodology in the book in early 2007. During this time, I read a number of books on value investing (e.g., The Essays of Warren Buffett, Benjamin Graham's The Intelligent Investor, etc.) that reinforced some of the principles of Greenblatt's Magic Formula.

I knew enough about the boom in commodities to be sure to include some of the handful of commodity companies that appeared on the list, but also included companies in other sectors. Aside from the commodity companies, all of which did well, and a couple of small cash-rich drug companies that were bought out for modest premiums, virtually every other stock in the portfolio plummeted. Judging from the lamentations on Yahoo! Finance's Magic Formula Investing Message Group, this has been a common experience.

In fairness to Joel Greenblatt, he did warn in his book that his Magic Formula system (like any mechanical system) wouldn't work all the time, and could under-perform the market for a few years in a row. In the book (pp. 71-73), Greenblatt also alluded to the hot-cold-hot roller coaster performance of O'Shaughnessy's screens in the 1990s, and to a period of under-performance experienced by his friend and fellow money manager Richard Pzena (neither O'Shaughnessy nor Pzena is mentioned by name in the book, but their identities are fairly clear from the descriptions). Nevertheless, the jaw-dropping Magic Formula losses last year (in what was, admittedly, an awful year for most broad-based value strategies) contrasted sharply with the back-tested performance of the Magic Formula system in Greenblatt's book. Over a 17-year testing period, the all-cap portfolio (with a minimum market cap of $1 million) only had one down year (the bear market year of 2002), and that year it merely had a single-digit loss.

After analyzing some of my losers, and see what some successful investors did differently, the lessons I took away were the importance of paying attention to the relevant macro trends, and that in a market when most stocks and most sectors are performing poorly, excessive diversification can be a liability.