Profiting from the Credit Crunch/Real Estate Bust

A friend and business associate directed my attention to this article in our local paper, The Record, about a couple of entrepreneurs, Jacob Benaroya and Danielle Brooks, that started a hedge fund to invest in distressed mortgages: "Firm finds value in bad loans". The partners founded the firm, Biltmore Capital, at the peak of the real estate boom three years ago. Excerpt:

Typically, Biltmore buys loans at about 50 cents on the dollar, although mortgages on truly distressed properties - for example, in Detroit - can be picked up for as little as 10 cents on the dollar.

[snip]

The eight-employee company expects to buy $100 million of mortgage debt in 2008. Benaroya said that could triple in 2009, as more subprime loans go bad. The company works in housing markets all over the nation, though the greatest concentration of bad loans is in the Rust Belt states, where the economy and job markets are troubled, and Florida, California, Arizona and Nevada, where there was a lot of overbuilding.

Although foreclosures have risen in New Jersey, they are nowhere near the rate in those distressed markets.

Ilan Kaufthal, a member of the board of Biltmore Capital, said he expects high returns in this business for the next year or two, because non-performing mortgages can be bought at such deep discounts.

"I think it's an extraordinary opportunity over the next few years for people who have the liquidity and cash to buy these mortgages," said Kaufthal, a former Bear Sterns executive who has also invested in Biltmore.

Last month, a similar article about entrepreneurs investing in distressed mortgages appeared in the OC Register, "Investor says only one road to foreclosure profit". Here's an excerpt from that article:

Robert Lee, a Huntington Beach-based investor in distressed home loans, says there is still plenty of pain ahead for the housing and mortgage markets.

Last year I shadowed Lee for a day and wrote a story about it. I had met him at a seminar and was impressed by his enthusiasm for investing in dud loans. Recently he and partner David Phelps have expanded their Web site foreclosuretrackers.com to cover all of Southern California as well as Clark County, Nevada. Last fall, the site just covered foreclosure filings in Orange County.

I quizzed Lee about the mortgage market, his business, and his prediction for a housing rebound. I have a feeling this interview will appeal more to housing bears than bulls.

That interview is worth reading.

U.S. Energy Corp. (USEG)

I started a position in U.S. Energy Corp. (USEG) last month at $2.85. Today it closed at $2.81. Below is a write-up of the company I initially posted on GuruFocus.com a few days after I bought the stock. I am re-posting it here now because I spoke with the CEO of USEG today, and before I post my notes on our conversation, I wanted to provide some background on his company, for those who may be unfamiliar with it.

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U.S. Energy Corp. (USEG) is an energy and natural resources exploration and development company currently trading for a third less than its book value (it was trading for .57x book when I bought it a few days ago). The management of USEG has a demonstrated track record of acquiring natural resource assets and selling them at opportune times for significant gains; the most recent example of such a successful sale occurred last year, and was the source of most of the company’s current cash hoard. USEG is a compelling value on its discount to book value alone, but four potential catalysts present opportunities for significant additional appreciation.


Valuation


USEG has a market cap of $75,470,000 and an enterprise value of $10,687,000 (subtracting both the company’s cash and its Treasury securities from the sum of its market cap and interest-bearing debt). It currently trades with P/B ratio of .66 and an EBIT/EV ratio of 82% (using trailing twelve-month data). The reason why the company trades at such a high earnings yield is because up until now it has generated its income through occasional deals rather than through consistent earnings. The company’s strategy going forward is to invest in assets that will produce recurring revenues while still pursuing large deals with windfall potential. The catalysts I describe below include examples of both. Note that the data above do not reflect the results of U.S. Energy’s sale, announced today, June 13th, 2008, of 39,062,072 shares of Sutter Gold Mining Inc. (SGM on the TSX Venture Exchange) for approximately $5,281,200 (in U.S. dollars).



Examples of USEG Management’s Timely Sale of Natural Resources Assets


Last year, U.S. Energy sold uranium properties that it had staked claims on during the 1990s, and had held onto as uranium prices dropped from the $ mid-teens per pound to $6.40 per pound in 2001. With uranium prices at uneconomical levels, U.S. Energy turned its focus to developing prospects for coal bed methane, but held onto its uranium properties. Through a subsidiary, Rocky Mountain Gas, U.S. Energy invested $15 million in the exploration and production of coal bed methane assets. Through a series of transactions, by the end of 2005, U.S. Energy had sold these assets for a total of $27.7 million.


Last April, when uranium prices were about $110 per pound, USEG sold its uranium properties to Uranium One Inc. (which trades under the symbol UUU.TO on the TSX) in exchange for 6.6 million shares in Uranium One, plus additional consideration, which I will expand on below. Uranium prices peaked in the mid-$130s a few months later, in the summer of 2007, and around that time USEG sold all of its shares of Uranium One Inc. for an average price of $13.68. Today, uranium is trading for less than $60 per pound, and shares of Uranium One Inc. are trading at about $4.30. This is an example of near-virtuosic timing and prudence on the part of USEG management, and one that bodes well for its handling of its current and future natural resource projects.


Catalysts


USEG has four potential catalysts to unlock additional value: One in the near-term (most likely this year), two in the medium term (within the next five years), and another in the longer-term (five years from now).


Near-Term Catalyst

· The Completion of a 216 Unit Residential Real Estate Project in Gillette, WY. Demand for housing in this part of Wyoming has been high recently because of the natural resources boom – the Gillette area produces about 40% of America’s coal, and the town’s population is growing by 7%-10% annually. Of the 216 units, 207 have been pre-leased. If USEG holds onto this property, its CEO Keith Larsen estimates it will generate about $250,000 in monthly revenue. Although USEG management sees promise in targeted real estate developments in regions participating in the natural resources boom, they have decided not to pursue any additional real estate projects, to assuage investor demand that they focus exclusively on energy and natural resource projects.

Medium-Term Catalysts

· Oil and Gas Exploration and Production. U.S. Energy has entered into separate partnership agreements with a private Houston-based oil and gas company and with Lafayette, LA-based Petroquest Energy (PQ on the NYSE). Drilling of the first three natural gas wells with Petroquest is expected to begin in June of 2008, and the drilling program with the private company is expected to begin in 2009. According to a presentation by Petroquest management dated June 2nd, 2008, Petroquest’s drilling success rate over the last 9 years has been 89%. U.S. Energy’s CEO has estimated that his company’s interest in these three wells alone could generate $250,000 in monthly revenue (the CEO estimates that USEG may be able to generate a total of approximately $750,000 in monthly revenue between interest income, income from the Gillette real estate development, and the potential revenue from these initial wells). USEG is evaluating other oil and gas investment opportunities to pursue in partnership with exploration & production companies that have proven, successful track records.
· Additional Payments from Uranium One. The largest part of the additional consideration that USEG received from Uranium One last year was $40 million to be paid contingent on the former USEG uranium properties meeting certain production targets; USEG management expects to receive this $40 million in the next few years as these production targets are met. Since USEG is such a small, little-followed stock, these windfall payments may act as catalysts for the share price as market participants see them appear in USEG’s quarterly filings. More importantly, USEG will be able to reinvest these moneys in energy and natural resource projects with promising returns.


Long-Term Catalyst


· Molybdenum Claims in Colorado. USEG’s patented “Lucky Jack” molybdenum claims near Crested Butte, Colorado, represent its most challenging project and also potentially its most lucrative one. USEG management estimates that a mine here could produce 15-20 million lbs of high-grade molybdenum per year, at a cost of about $10 per lb, and that the mine could have a 50-year life. Molybdenum, the demand for which has been driven partly by the global infrastructure boom, currently trades at over $33 per lb, so the potential profits from a Lucky Jack mine at current prices hold would be over $345 million per year. Currently, USEG has commissioned an engineering study of the project, and intends to submit a plan of operation to the U.S. Forestry Service by the end of 2008. If all obstacles are surmounted, and USEG can build a mine here, it would first start producing molybdenum in 2013. USEG may be able to monetize part of its interest in this project before then though, since it plans to sell a stake in its claim to an established mining company and have that company help develop the project.

From Joel Greenblatt to Jim Rogers, Part III: The Importance of Macro Trends

The intent of this series of posts is to put my later posts about specific investment ideas in context, by describing the evolution of my thinking on investing over the last year and a half, as I've made mistakes and tried to learn from them. I'm going to break this up into a few posts, just to keep each post from being too long.

The Importance of Paying Attention to the Relevant Macro Trends

Another lesson I picked up over the last year and a half was the importance of paying attention to the relevant macro trends when evaluating potential investments. It's important to remember here that the Magic Formula is a backward-looking screening system: it uses trailing 12-month data to calculate earnings yield and return on invested capital, on the theory that, more often than not, trailing data are predictive of future performance. The impact of relevant macro trends can determine to what extent this will be true. For example, a wallboard company might have had impressive trailing twelve month earnings at the beginning of 2006, due to the residential construction boom that peaked during the previous year, but those trailing earnings wouldn't have been a good guide to its earnings during the construction bust to come. Below is an example of a mistake I made last year by not paying attention to the relevant macro trend.


Anatomy of a Mistake

I originally wrote the following postmortem on the GuruFocus website on April 24th. Since then, the stock is down a little bit more (it closed at $11.78 today), but otherwise nothing has changed materially.

Recently, I've written about the importance of acknowledging and addressing relevant macro-trends when evaluating investment opportunities. This doesn't mean that I think one should only invest in a company when the relevant macro-trends or macro-environment are in its favor; I would consider investing in a company facing negative macro-trends or a negative macro-environment if I thought those negative macro-trends were fully priced-in, or if I thought those negative macro-trends were nearing an end.


One example of an investing mistake I made by not paying attention to the relevant macro-trend was my investment in Barrett Business Services Inc. (BBSI) at $24.28 per share last year in my Magic Formula portfolio. Today BBSI closed at $12.50 per share.


Barrett is a staffing/PEO firm serving small and mid-sized businesses primarily. When I bought the stock last year, Barrett Business Services was fundamentally a solid company: no debt, lots of cash, a no-nonsense CEO who had steadily built the company up over 27 years and owned 25% of the company's stock, etc. That's all still true today, but nevertheless, it was a mistake to buy the company when I did, because I didn't consider the relevant macro-trend.


The relevant macro-trend in Barrett's case was the real estate bust in California. Although Barrett has operations in several regions of the country, and clients in different industries, most of its business comes from California. Because California experienced one of the biggest real estate booms in the country, it also is experiencing one of the biggest real estate busts, and the effects on California's economy have been worse than on the national economy so far (on today's conference call, Barrett's CEO estimated that California's unemployment rate is now about 7.5%). Also, during economic downturns, outsourced/temporary workers are often the first to get laid off, so Barrett was quick to feel the consequences of this (conversely, as Barrett's CEO pointed out on today's call, outsourced/temporary workers are also the first to get hired during an economic upturn).


Ideally, the best time to invest in a company like BBSI would be just as the negative macro-trend was ending, but of course there is no way to time that exactly. That doesn't mean, however, that I can let myself off the hook for buying BBSI when I did. The magnitude of the real estate bust in California was obvious at the time, and I should have connected the dots and realized how this would lead to a deterioration in California's labor market.


On today's conference call, Barrett's CEO discussed how he would be using this economic downturn (as he had used previous downturns) to increase market share and position Barrett to do well during the next economic upturn. I have no reason to doubt that. I would consider investing more in BBSI within the next few months, assuming it's still on the Magic Formula list. It was still a mistake for me to buy BBSI when I did though, at the beginning of the current downturn.

A counter example of a stock I bought last June that was facing a positive macro trend is the oil royalty trust BPT that I posted about here earlier today and last Friday. Not surprisingly, I am up 50%+ on BPT over the same time frame that I am down 50%+ on BBSI.